### TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that on December 6, 2004, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard before the Honorable James Ware, in Courtroom 8 of the above-entitled Court, located at 280 South First Street, San Jose, California, Defendant MBNA America Bank, N.A. ("MBNA") will and hereby does move this Court for an Order, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiff John Gorman ("Gorman") and each purported cause of action alleged therein against MBNA, on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As demonstrated in the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the complaint is subject to dismissal on the following grounds:

- 1. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Libel is preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681 *et seq.* (the "FCRA") and therefore must be dismissed, with prejudice, and without leave to amend.
- 2. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for alleged violations of section 1785.25 of the California Civil Code is preempted by the FCRA and therefore must be dismissed, with prejudice, and without leave to amend.
- 3. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for alleged violations of section 1681n of the FCRA must fail since, based upon controlling Ninth Circuit authority, no private right of action exists for alleged violations of a furnisher's duties under 15 U.S.C § 1681s-2(a). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed, with prejudice, and without leave to amend.
- 4. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for alleged violations of section 16810 of the FCRA must fail since, based upon controlling Ninth Circuit authority, no private right of action exists for alleged violations of a furnisher's duties under 15 U.S.C § 1681s-2(a). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed, with prejudice, and without leave to amend.
- 5. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (the "FDCPA") fails because MBNA is not a "debt collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA. The claim must therefore be dismissed, with prejudice, and without leave to amend.

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1	This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying			
2	Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith, the pleadings and records on file in			
3	this action, and upon such other further evidence and argument that may be presented at the			
4	hearing on this Motion.			
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6	DATED: November 1, 2004		BERG, SIM O B. NARIT	MONDS & NARITA LLP
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### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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#### I. **INTRODUCTION**

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II. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

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In this case, plaintiff (and counsel of record) John Gorman asserts a series of claims against MBNA based upon MBNA's alleged failure to report accurate information about Gorman's credit card debt to various credit reporting agencies. Gorman also alleges that "defendants" made harassing phone calls to him in an effort to collect the debt. By this motion, defendant MBNA seeks an Order, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissing each of the five causes of action asserted against MBNA.

As demonstrated herein, all of Gorman's claims based upon MBNA's alleged conduct in reporting inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies must fail. His first two state law claims (for libel and for violations of section 1785.25 of the California Civil Code) are expressly preempted by the FCRA. His third and fourth claims, for alleged "wilful" and "negligent" violations of the FCRA, stem from MBNA's alleged failure to furnish accurate information under section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA. The Ninth Circuit has already held that there is no private right of action for such claims. Finally, his fifth claim for alleged violations of the FDCPA fails because MBNA is not a "debt collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA.

All of Gorman's claims are barred as a matter of law, and it would be futile to grant him leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, MBNA respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order dismissing the complaint, with prejudice, and without leave to amend.

The complaint alleges that "in or about 2003" a dispute arose between Gorman and MBNA with respect to certain charges that had been posted on Gorman's MBNA credit card account. Complaint ¶ 7. According to Gorman, he notified MBNA in writing that the charges in question were not legitimate and were disputed. Id. at  $\P$  8. Gorman alleges that MBNA temporarily removed the disputed charges from his account, but MBNA later re-

posted the disputed charges and refused to remove them, despite multiple requests from Gorman. *Id*.

The complaint also alleges that "in spring 2004" Gorman discovered that defendants were reporting "inaccurate and incomplete" information about him, and he allegedly asked defendants and various credit reporting agencies to correct the "defamatory information." *Id.* at ¶ 12. Gorman claims that defendants have taken no corrective action and that they "continue to report the debt as delinquent without indicating that the charges are disputed" by Gorman. *Id.* 

Significantly, the complaint does <u>not</u> allege whether (or when) MBNA was notified by any credit reporting agency that Gorman disputed any charges. Gorman also does <u>not</u> allege that, once notified by a credit reporting agency, MBNA failed to investigate his dispute, or that MBNA's investigation was incomplete or insufficient.

The pleading states that in "2003 and through late February 2004" the "defendants" repeatedly telephoned Gorman at his residence and office and "made threatening and harassing phone calls regarding the alleged debt" despite being requested by Gorman, both orally and in writing, to cease and desist such calls. *Id.* at ¶¶ 10-11. Gorman does not specify when he allegedly told "defendants" to stop calling him. Nor does Gorman identify anything said by MBNA during any allegedly "threatening or harassing" phone call.

Based upon these skeletal allegations, the complaint purports to assert five separate causes of action against MBNA: 1) the First Cause of Action for Libel, 2) the Second Cause of Action for violation of section 1785.25 of the California Civil Code, 3) the Third Cause of Action for violation of section 1681n of the FCRA, 4) the Fourth Cause of Action for violation of section 1681o of the FCRA, and 5) the Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the FDCPA. All of the claims fail as a matter of law.

### III. ARGUMENT

## A. The First Cause of Action for Libel is Preempted by The FCRA

In his First Cause of Action, Gorman asserts that MBNA's conduct in reporting allegedly inaccurate information about his debt to credit reporting agencies after Gorman disputed certain charges "constitutes libel" under California law. As this Court has previously held, however, libel claims like Gorman's implicate conduct falling within the subject matter of section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA, and are therefore preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the FCRA. See Davis v. Maryland Bank, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26468 (N. D. Cal. 2002). The First Cause of Action for libel must be dismissed.

Like Gorman, the plaintiff in *Davis* sought to pursue, *inter alia*, a common law defamation claim based upon a credit card issuer's alleged reporting of inaccurate information to a credit reporting agency concerning a disputed debt. *Id.* at \*7. But Congress enacted section 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the FCRA as part of its effort to create a "uniform scheme governing the disclosure of credit information" and it would undermine Congress' intent to allow consumers to pursue common law tort claims that implicate the same subject matter of the FCRA. *Id.* at \*41. The conduct challenged in *Davis* (like the conduct challenged by Gorman here) is regulated by section 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) which provides that a "person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer reporting agency if the person knows or consciously avoids knowing that the information is inaccurate." *Id.* at \*37. The FCRA preempts any state law claim falling within the "subject matter" regulated by section 1681s-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Section 1681t of the FCRA, which includes the preemption provisions at issue in this action, provides in relevant part:

<sup>&</sup>quot;No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State--

<sup>(1)</sup> with respect to any subject matter regulated under-

<sup>(</sup>F) section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply—

<sup>(</sup>i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or

<sup>(</sup>ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on September 30, 1996)."

2 of the statute. *Id.* at \*36-37. Since the alleged defamation was based on "the precise conduct which is proscribed under section 1681s-2(a)-(b)" (*id.* at 44) the *Davis* court held the claim was "preempted under section 1681t(b)(1)(F)." *Id.* at \*44, 46.<sup>2</sup>

Here, as in *Davis*, Gorman seeks to pursue a defamation claim against MBNA based upon its alleged reporting of inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies after 2003 when MBNA received notice of Gorman's dispute. Complaint ¶¶ 7-8. But this alleged conduct by MBNA is the same "subject matter" governed under section 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) of the FCRA. Accordingly, Gorman's libel claim is preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the FCRA and it must be dismissed.

B. The Second Cause Of Action For Alleged Violations of Section 1785.25 of the California Civil Code is Preempted by The FCRA

In his Second Cause of Action, Gorman alleges that MBNA provided "incomplete and inaccurate" information about him to consumer credit reporting agencies in violation of section 1785.25 of the California Civil Code, which is part of the California Credit Reporting Agencies Act (the "CCRAA"). This Court has repeatedly held, however, that a consumer cannot pursue a private right of action under the CCRAA because sections

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> While it appears that no circuit court has ruled on whether a defamation claim of this type is preempted by the FCRA, numerous other district courts have reached the same result. See Alkagi v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1194-95 (D. Kan. 2002)(defamation claim based upon conduct arising after receipt of notice of dispute was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Malm v. Household Bank, 2004 WL 1559370, at \*6 (D. Minn. 2004)(slip copy) (same); Riley v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1322-25 (S. D. Ala. 2002) (same); Bank One v. Colley, 294 F. Supp. 2d 864, 869 (M.D. La. 2003) (same); Hasvold v. First USA Bank, N.A., 194 F. Supp.2d 1228, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002) (holding that "all" state causes of action relating to the responsibilities of furnishers of information are preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Purcell v. Universal Bank, N.A., 2003 WL 1962376, \*5 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (same). The Davis court was aware of only one case holding that common law tort claims did not fall within the preemption provided by section 1681t(b)(1)(F). Davis, at \*40 (citing Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). There have been others. See, e.g., Carlson v. TransUnion, 259 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N. D. Tex. 2003); Jeffery v. TransUnion, 273 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. Va. 2003).

1785.25(g) and 1785.31 of the California Civil Code are preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the FCRA. See Lin v. Universal Card Services Corporation, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1152 (N. D. Cal. 2002); Quigley v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, 2000 WL 1721069, at \*3 (N. D. Cal. 2000). Thus, the Second Cause of action must be dismissed.

The plaintiff in *Lin* alleged that a credit card issuer had inaccurately reported information about him to credit reporting agencies in violation of section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code. *Lin*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. This Court acknowledged in *Lin* that section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code was expressly exempted from the preemptive effect of section 1681t(b)(1)(F)(ii) of the FCRA. *Id.* at 1151. However, the Court also noted that the two sections of the California Civil Code which confer a private right of action to consumers for violations of the CCRAA (namely, sections 1785.25(g) and 1785.31) were <u>not</u> exempted from preemption. *Id.* at 1152-53. As a result, this Court dismissed the plaintiff's section 1785.25 claim. *Id.* at 1153. *Accord Quigley*, 2000 WL at \*3 (holding that any private right of action under the California Civil Code based upon the conduct of a furnisher of information is preempted by the FCRA).

Here, as in Lin and Quigley, Gorman seeks to pursue a section 1785.25 claim against MBNA based upon MBNA's alleged conduct in providing "incomplete and inaccurate" information about him to various consumer credit reporting agencies. Complaint ¶ 19. This claim is expressly preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the FCRA and must fail.

C. The Third And Fourth Causes of Action For Alleged Violations of The FCRA Fail Because There Is No Private Right of Action Based On A Furnisher's Alleged Breach of Its Duty To Accurately Report To A Credit Reporting Agency

In his Third and Fourth Causes of Action, Gorman alleges that MBNA "wilfully"

however, since the Ninth Circuit has already determined that no private right of action exists

and/or "negligently" violated its duties under the FCRA when MBNA furnished information about him to credit reporting agencies. Complaint ¶¶ 27, 32. Both claims must fail,

for alleged violations of a furnisher's duty under section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA to accurately report information to credit reporting agencies. *See Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.*, 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002).

In *Nelson*, the plaintiff claimed that a bank violated the FCRA when the bank mistakenly reported to credit reporting agencies that his loan had been discharged in bankruptcy. *Nelson*, 282 F.3d at 1058. The Court observed that furnishers have an affirmative duty to report complete and accurate information to credit reporting agencies under section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA. *Id.* at 1059. However, *Nelson* recognized that two other subsections of the FCRA (sections 1681s-2(c) and 1681s-2(d)), expressly provide that there is <u>no</u> private right of action to enforce the obligations established by section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA. *Id.* A furnisher's duties under section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA must be exclusively enforced by the federal and state officials identified in the statute. *Id.* at 1059.

Here, like the plaintiff in *Nelson*, the allegations of Gorman's Third and Fourth Causes of Action clearly fall within the ambit of MBNA's alleged duties under section 1681s-2(a) of the FCRA. Gorman alleges that MBNA willfully and negligently failed "to comply with the requirements of the FCRA with regard to the furnishing of information about plaintiff." Complaint ¶¶ 27, 32. Under *Nelson*, there is no private right of action to enforce MBNA's section 1681s-2(a) duties, and these claims must also be dismissed.

D. The Fifth Cause of Action Fails Since MBNA is Not a "Debt Collector" Within The Meaning of The FDCPA

In his Fifth Cause of Action, Gorman alleges that "defendants" violated various provisions of the FDCPA (15 U. S. C. §1692 *et seq.*) when they allegedly "repeatedly and knowingly" contacted Gorman at home and at work in a manner that was "harassing, threatening, abusive, oppressive, and annoying." Complaint ¶ 35. The claim must fail, however, since MBNA is a creditor, not a "debt collector" within the meaning of the Act.

The FDCPA expressly limits its application to the conduct of a "debt collector" which is defined as:

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any 1 business the principle purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who 2 regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or *due another*. 3 See 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)(emphasis added); see also Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 4 5 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting agreement among federal courts that "a creditor is not a debt collector for the purposes of the FDCPA and creditors are not subject to the FDCPA when collecting their accounts."). It is undisputed that Gorman is alleging that MBNA was the creditor that owned his debt. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 7-8. Since the FDCPA applies to "debt collectors" but not to creditors like MBNA that are attempting to collect on their own debts, the Fifth Cause of Action must be dismissed. 10 11 12 IV. **CONCLUSION** For each of the foregoing reasons, defendant MBNA respectfully requests that this 13 Court enter and Order, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 15 dismissing the claims asserted against MBNA, with prejudice, and without leave to amend. 16 DATED: November 1, 2004 WINEBERG, SIMMONDS & NARITA LLP TOMIO B. NARITA 17 18 19 20 By: /s/21 Tomio B. Narita Attorney for Defendants 22 Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P and MBNA America Bank, N.A. 23 24 25 26 27 28